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Abstract
In unequal societies, the rich might benet from shaping economic institutions into their favor.
This paper analyzes dynamics of institutional subversion focusing on one particular institution,
public protection of property rights. If this institution is imperfect, agents have incentives to
invest in private protection of property rights. With economies of scale in private protection, rich
agents have a signicant advantage in such an environment: they could expropriate other agents
using their private protection capacities. Ability to maintain private protection system makes the
rich natural political opponents of full protection of property rights provided by the state. Such
an environment does not allow grass-roots demand to drive development of new market-friendly
institutions (such as public protection of property rights). The economy as a whole is stuck in
a 'bad' long-run equilibrium with low growth rate, high inequality, and wide-spread rent-seeking.
Russian `oligarchs' of 90s, few politically powerful agents that controlled large stakes of the newly
privatized property, were a major motivating example for this paper.
1The author is grateful to Francois Bourguignon, Do Quy-Toan, Richard Ericson, Jim Leitzel,
Leonid Polishchuk, Victor Polterovich, Gerard Roland, Jacek Rostowski, and Judith Thornton for
various helpful comments. Financial support of EERC-Russia is gratefully acknowledged.
This paper is a thorough revision of the CEPR Discussion Paper 2300 "Inequality, Property
Rights Protection, and Economic Growth in Transition Economies: Theory and Russian Evidence".
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1 Introduction
If the state does not protect economic agents from unlawful expropriation, they might do it
themselves. One way to protect one's property is to maintain a private protection system,
e.g., to hire a security rm or establish corrupt relationship with a public ocial. An alter-
native way for an agent is to reveal his preferences for more public protection of property
rights through various political mechanisms, e.g., by voting for an appropriate candidate
in a general election. In transition and developing economies, the latter option is often
suppressed due to underdevelopment of political institutions. As a result, economic agents
are forced to supplement their productive investment with investment in private protection.
With economies of scale in private protection, rich agents have a signicant advantage when
operating in an environment with incomplete public protection of property rights. Further-
more, their ability to gain from redistribution due to improper protection of property rights
makes them natural opponents of improvements in public protection of property rights.
The economy, where the rich support the regime of incomplete protection of property
rights is an example of what Glaeser et al (2002) call 'subversion of institutions'. Rich agents
can use their wealth and accumulated political power to shape the performance of economic
institutions in their favor. Inequality encourages institutional subversion by the rich, which
in turn lead to increased inequality.2 This paper focuses on dynamics of institutional choice:
political process determines the level of redistribution of wealth in the society, which in turn
aects political choices of future generations.
One example of rapid institutional change is provided by transition economies, a "policy
laboratory" for economists (Djankov and Murrel, 2002). The transition experience has made
it very clear that liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and de-jure privatization in a
former command economy are not sucient conditions for an upturn in economic activity.
Among various explanations of the continued failure of some economies to achieve sustainable
growth, the inability of the state to promote development of `good' economic institutions
and the unexpected stability of `bad' ones appears to be of particular interest. One goal
of this paper is to provide micro- and political foundations for an environment, which does
not allow grass-roots demand for protection of property rights to drive development of new
market-friendly institutions. In particular, we demonstrate that if the rich have enough
2One limit to subversion of the property rights protection institution is that the beneciaries of subversion
still have to protect themselves from each other (Murphy et al, 1993).
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political power to choose the level of public property rights protection, the economy could
be locked in a stable long-run equilibrium with poor public protection of property rights.
The process of public enforcement and regulation of property rights by the state is in-
uenced by social demands. Agents reveal their preferences over government policy through
various political mechanisms. It is quite natural to expect that it is the rich agents who
favor full protection of property rights. However, there is substantial evidence that in many
countries outside the modern developed world rich agents are the main beneciaries of poor
protection of property rights, which allows them to gain from non-productive activities such
as rent-seeking or any other redistributive activity through maintenance of expropriation
capacities. In the absence of adequate public protection of property rights by the state,
these rent-oriented structures (in modern Russia, their leaders are often referred to as 'oli-
garchs') might take control of a substantial share of the national economy. Usually, these
structures combine productive activity with an extensive struggle for the rent-seeking pie.
The oligarchs' success at rent-seeking makes it unsurprising that they prefer relatively poor
protection of property rights. This in turn forces other economic agents to invest in private
protection from expropriation. This may be the main reason why the Russian state has
failed as yet to establish and enforce a clearly dened system of property rights.
It is by no means assumed that an agent investing in private protection of property rights
invests necessarily in military capacities or such like. Rather, it may be investment in rela-
tional capital, e.g. in establishing corrupt relations with state authorities, costly relational
contracting, or hiring a lawyer. In economic terms, it is a strategy of an economic agent
to increase eciency and predictability in his business relations.3 Since private protection
capacities can be used to obtain various types of rents, we consider investment in private
protections as a particular case of rent-seeking.
In the initial Tullock (1980) model of rent-seeking and in a great majority of other papers
devoted to unproductive activities, agents compare their costs and benets of participating
in rent-seeking. In these models, agents usually have a clear choice of whether or not to
participate in expropriation (or perhaps mix productive and appropriative activities). In our
analysis, it seems reasonable to assume that there can be no business without investment
in private protection of property rights (e.g., Alexeev et al 1997; Leitzel, 1997). Then, as
stressed in Shleifer (1997), the agents having private protection have incentives to expropriate
3Hendley, Murrell, and Ryterman (1998) analyze various types of such strategies of Russian enterprises.
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resources from others. This makes wide-spread private enforcement of property rights in
transition economies inherently stable.
There are three basic types of negative consequences of poor protection of property rights
for growth. First, the necessity to protect wastes resources as private protection (or any
other kind of rent-seeking) is an unproductive activity. Second, the threat of expropriation
distorts the economic environment and leads to suboptimal paths of capital accumulation
and production. Third, extensive rent-seeking and improper public protection of property
rights are usually associated with substantial income and wealth inequality. The impacts
of inequality and redistribution policies on economic growth are studied in various growth-
theory papers. In Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Benabou
(1996), it is shown, both theoretically and empirically, that inequality is harmful for growth.
In these papers, and also in Perotti (1993), the poor are the beneciaries of redistribution:
such redistribution may occur through progressive taxation of capital income, direct social
transfers, extensive regulation, trade and capital restrictions, etc. Persson and Tabellini
(1994) simply assume that incomplete protection of property rights (through proportional
tax on income) leads to redistribution of wealth from rich agents to poor. This paper departs
from the growth-theory literature in assuming that the rich are beneciaries of redistribution.
In Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) the rich benet from redistribution, but face a threat of
revolution. Glaeser et al (2002) analyses the impact of inequality on subversion of capitalist
institutions. Do (2002) focuses on the micromechanism which relates inequality and the
extent of regulatory capture.
The negative impact of poor protection of property rights on economic growth has been
long stressed by classics (e.g., Smith, 1776, North, 1981). Using an axiomatic approach,
income distribution in a rent-seeking environment is studied in Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas
(1992), and Skaperdas and Syropuolos (1997). In Grossman and Kim (1995), agents allocate
real resources between appropriative and productive activities in a general equilibrium model.
Spontaneous emergence of property rights have been studied by many authors. Gelb, Hilman,
and Ursprung (1995) noted that in Russia ambiguous property rights provide prizes for rent-
seeking constests. Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) modeled a one-shot rent-seeking game
to favor rich agents at the expense of poor, and explored static general equilibria properties
of the model. An empirical evidence on unocial economy in transition is presented and
extensively discussed in Johnson et al (1998). The political economy of partial reforms
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in transition economies with the emphasis on the role of powerful rent-seekers in keeping
the economy in an intermediate ineective state is discussed (without a formal model) in
Hellman (1998).
This paper contributes to the literature studying the interrelationship of inequality and
institutional dynamics. The rich redistribute the wealth from poor, which leads to increas-
ing inequality,and thus more possibilities for the rich to gain from redistribution. Increased
inequality may lead to more political demand for better institutions (higher level of property
rights protection). If there is a signicant wealth bias in the political system, the economy
might be stuck in the long-run stable equilibrium, where these two forces (increasing inequal-
ity due to redistribution and decreasing level of redistribution due to increased inequality)
oset each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, an endogenous growth model
that allows to investigate interrelationship between rent-seeking (private protection of prop-
erty rights), inequality, and growth is introduced, and the rst results are derived. Section
3 analyses the political economy of property rights protection. Section 4 contains a brief
analysis of Russian oligarchs, who were the main motivating example for this paper, and
presents evidence not related to transition economies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Private Enforcement of Property Rights
In this section, we employ a standard model of endogenous growth to analyze the impact of
incomplete property rights on growth. In an overlapping-generations setup, agents choose
the amount they invest in production and private protection.
2.1 The Setup
There is a continuum [0; 1] of heterogeneous overlapping-generations families. Each member
i born at the period t has the utility function
uit = ln cit +  ln dit;
where cit is consumption when young, dit is consumption when old, and  is the common
discount factor. This agent i is born endowed with individual-specic basic level of skills
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wit: To simplify the subsequent analysis, it is assumed that the skills are distributed across
agents log-normally:
lnwit  N(m;ﬀ2);
and let wt denote the mean (and the aggregate) level of basic skills, where wt = Ewit:
Intergenerational linkages are as follows:
wit+1 = "it+1yit;
where "it+1 is an i.i.d. shock with mean 1 and V ar [ln "it+1] = 2; yit is the second-period
income of the member of family i (to be dened later).4 Herein time indices are skipped as
the analysis is focused on members of one generation.
Each agent i has an access to a Cobb-Douglas technology, so that the second-period
income is yi = Aeki w1 ; where eki is productive capital after redistribution, A is an exoge-
nously given technological parameter, and w is the economy-wide endowment of basic skills.
The eki depends not only on the capital investment ki of the agent i, but also on investment of
the agent i into private protection of property rights, and both types of investment of other
agents (see below). There are no credit markets, so agents have no possibility to borrow or
lend to optimize consumption intertemporarily.
In addition to investment in production as described below, each agent may invest in
protection of her property rights. If ki is the capital expenditures of the agent i, and hi is
the amount invested in protection, then after redistribution the agent's i productive capital
is eki = kihi g. So, for each individual agent production and private protection are strategic
complements. The factor g is dened by the balance conditionZ 1
0
ekidi = Z 1
0
kihi gdi =
Z 1
0
kidi:
The parameter   0 measures the eectiveness of protection.5 The case  = 0 then
corresponds to full public protection of property rights. In this case, hi = 0; g = 1; and no
redistribution actually takes place. If  > 0; then, given the redistribution technology, each
4Technically, this setup is a familiar growth model (Persson and Tabellini, 1994, Verdier, 1994, Benabou,
1996). It allows to obtain closed-form solutions for maximization problems and thus greatly simplify ex-
position. At the same, most of qualitative remain the same in a much broader context, with an arbitrary
non-degenerate distribution of wealth, dierent intra-generational linkages, and not necessarily multiplicative
redistribution mechanism.
5This technology is both oensive and defensive in the sense of Grossman and Kim, 1995.
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agent invests some positive amount of capital in protection. The balance condition above
shows that this investment is totally wasted. In Tullock (1980) words, there is a negative
sum game.
The after-redistribution capital of the agent i iseki = kihiR 1
0 kih

idi
Z 1
0
kidi:
This might be interpreted as a special form of a Tullock-type rent-seeking competition. Here
contest inputs hi are weighted by the amount of capital invested, and the whole capital
invested in production forms the rent-seeking pie. This type of redistribution possesses the
basic features of rent-seeking: the relative success is a function of the parties' respective
resource commitments. Precisely, the agent's proportionate share of the pie depends pos-
itively on her contest input and negatively on contest inputs of the others. The value of
the prize,
R 1
0 kidi; is endogenous variable as productive and appropriative capital are rival
uses of resources (Hirshleifer, 1988 and Skaperdas, 1995). It is assumed, departing from the
initial Tullock framework, that each agent takes
R 1
0 kih

idi as given.
2.2 Property Rights Protection and Growth
Agent i has the following maximization problem:
max
ki;hi
n
ln(wi   ki   hi) +  ln(A(eki)w1 )o :
A standard procedure gives the solution:
ki = p(; )wi; hi = r(; )wi;
where p(; ) and r(; ) are shares of the wealth agent i invests in production and protection,
respectively. Here investment in productive capital rises with improvement of property rights
protection ( decreases) and productivity,  : @@p(; ) < 0 and
@
@p(; ) > 0: Investment
in expropriation and thus welfare losses rise with ; i.e. @@r(; ) > 0. If property rights are
fully secured,  = 0; then hi = 0; and each agent splits his endowment between consumption
and production.
Those agents that lose in redistribution overconsume in the rst period, while those who
gain underconsume compared to the case of  = 0: That is, beside the dead-weight losses,
rent-seeking distorts economic environment.
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The second-period income of the agent i is
yi = Ap(; )w
(1+)
i
w 
Ew1+i
 :
Summing over all agents, one can get an expression for the growth rate of the aggregate
income:
() = ln(y=w) = lnA+  ln p(; )  (1  )(1 + )2ﬀ2
2
:
With low level of property rights protection (high ); agents divert more resources from
production to private protection of property rights. Proposition 1 summarizes the above
discussion.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium consumption and investment in production of any agent in-
creases with the level of property rights protection, while equilibrium in investment in private
protection decreases. The growth rate of the economy increases with the level of property
rights protection, and is maximized when property rights are fully secured,  = 0:
Investing into private protection, agents do not internalize the impact of their actions on
other agents' decisions: it increase incentives to invest into private protection and diminish
incentives to invest into production. The negative eect of poor protection of property rights
on growth comes from two sources: First, the lower is the level of property rights protection
by the state (i.e. the higher is ), the more resources are devoted to private protection,
a directly unproductive activity. Second, an increase in  makes budget constraints more
binding; this eect is reected in the second term of the growth equation: in the absence
of asset markets poor underinvest compared to the socially ecient level. Since the rich are
the main beneciaries of redistributive activity, inequality (as represented by ﬀ) hampers
productive investment and thus growth given any level of property rights protection . If the
capital market is perfect with the interest rate equal to the marginal product of productive
capital, then the growth rate is () = lnA +  ln p(); and there is no second eect of
incomplete protection of property rights as all the agents will invest the same amount of
capital in production. Also, in this case inequality does not aect the growth rate. It is of
course hard to imagine perfect capital markets in the absence of full protection of property
rights. If we instead assume that loans and debts are subject for expropriation in the way
described above, the results will be essentially the same.
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2.3 Why Is Manna so Harmful for Growth?
Once a private protection system is maintained, it can be used to contest many types of
rents at the same time. A related politician may help in establishing import taris in one
industry and shaping regulation in another. As clearly demonstrated by the East Asia
example (Claessens et al, 2000), oligarchs tend to have well-diversied businesses. We show
that if, in addition to amending production, investment in private protection can be used to
contest other rents, agents have more incentives to invest in private protection. The situation
is worse, the bigger is the rent-seeking pie. Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1993) emphasize
that this might make rent-seeking self-generating. For example, when a foreign aid or loan
is obtained, large rent-seekers may maintain their appropriative capacities to struggle for
the pie, and then use the oensive weapons to appropriate resources from others. Oense
creates the demand for defense, and so on. The same logic applies to many privatization
cases. Further, where rent-seeking is allowed (public protection of property rights is poor),
natural rents constitute an attractive pie. Gazprom, a natural gas monopoly, pays roughly a
quarter of taxes collected by Russian government. In a developing country such as Mobutu's
Zaire, natural rents may be even greater as a share of the country's GDP.
To model the eect of exogenous ow of rents to the economy, assume that, besides
production and expropriation, an agent gains from 'pure' rent-seeking. The agent's i share
of the pie depends positively on her own investment in private protection (expropriation) , hi;
and negatively on investment of the other agents. Specically, it is assumed that the agent's
i productive capital after redistribution is eki = kihi g + hiwiH ; where  is an exogenous
rent-seeking pie, the multiplier g is dened as above by the balance condition on the capital
market, and H =
R 1
0 h

idi; the sum of contest inputs of all agents. (See Hirshleifer, 1989, for
general properties of rent-seeking games.) Again, the rent-seeking technology favors rich:
this is captured by the agent-specic constant wi:6 For the sake of simplicity, it is assumed
that  = 1; and therefore inequality do not play any role in the subsequent analysis, and
also  = 1:7Thus, the agent's i problem can be written as follows.
max
ki;hi0;ki+hiwi
n
ln(wi   ki   hi) + lnAekio :
Solving the problem, one can obtain optimal investment in production and expropriation in
6The qualitative results go through without such an assumption. This particular assumption allows to
get a closed-form solution and greatly simplies comparative statics.
7Main results below hold in a more general setup (e.g., for ;  6= 1):
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the presence of exogenous rent:
ki = p(;)wi; hi = r(;)wi:
If the pie, ; is large enough, then the endowment, wi; splits between consumption in the
rst period and investment in expropriation. In what follows, it is assumed that all solutions
are interior. First, we observe that @@p(;) < 0 and
@
@r(;) > 0; i.e. the larger is the
rent-seeking pie, the smaller is investment into production and the larger is the investment
into private protection, which increase agent's proceeds from rent-seeking.
Proposition 2 The larger is the additional rent-seeking pie, ; the lower is the growth rate
 = (;) of the economy.
3 Political Economy of Redistribution
The next goal is to determine the level of property rights protection preferred by agent i:
Agent i faces the following maximization problem:
max
0
(
ui() = ln(1  (p+ r))wi +  lnApw(1+)i w 
Ew1+i
) :
It is an easy exercise to prove that any agent i has single-peaked preferences over   0: This
assures that the agent's i problem has a unique solution, i : As predicted in Gelb, Hillman,
and Ursprung (1995), the poorer is the agent, the higher level of property rights protection
she prefers.8
Proposition 3 (i) If wi  wj; then i  j ; that is, the richer the agent, the less secured
property rights she prefers.
(ii) There exists a unique threshold w such that any agent i with wi  w prefers full
protection of property rights, i = 0; while any agent i with wi > w prefers incomplete
protection of property rights, i > 0:
8Polishchuk and Savvateev (1997) derive results similar to Proposition 2 in a static model, where pro-
duction and rent-seeking are strategic substitutes. The basic intuition is that production process exhibits
diminishing marginal returns, while returns to rent-seeking are constant.
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In the recent rent-seeking literature, the level of property rights protection is often en-
dogenous (e.g., Grossman and Kim, 1995). However, the nature of rent-seeking models left
little chances that these models may be modied for the study of growth issues. Perotti
(1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Benabou (1996) have
endogenized tax policy in the political equilibrium of endogenous-growth models. In this sec-
tion, the next goal is to endogenize the level of property rights protection, as parametrized
by ; in an analogous way. It is assumed that the old generation does not participate in the
political process. The most straightforward approach is the use of the median-voter theorem
(Grandmont, 1978). However, it is doubtful that transition economies satisfy the 'one person,
one vote' ideal. Rather, anecdotal evidence suggests that the level of property rights protec-
tion (i.e. the actual performance of institutions) is determined by a relatively narrow group
of powerful agents. Let the pivotal voter located at the th percentile of the wealth (instead
of usual 50th percentile). Then her wealth w is dened by F ((lnw  m)=ﬀ)) = ; where
F is the c.d.f. of a standard normal. One can reformulate this as follows: lnw = m + ﬀ;
where  = F 1(): If  > 0; that is  > 12 ; the political system is biased toward rich. His-
torically, this case corresponds to wealth-restricted franchise. Today, the bias toward rich
might be due to their high lobbying power, imperfect political information, dependence on
transfers from the central government in a transition economy, etc.9
To investigate the eects of the wealth bias in the political system, substitute lnw =
m+ ﬀ into u0i() = 0 for wp  w (  ﬀ + 1ﬀ ) and note that  = 0 if   ﬀ + 1ﬀ :
Proposition 4 (i) The more democratic is the society (the lower is the degree of wealth bias
of the pivotal voter, ); the more secure are property rights in the political equilibrium (the
lower is ). If  exceeds some threshold e then  strictly increases with :
(ii) For any pivotal voter, the higher is the productivity of production, () or the more
valuable is the future (); the more protection of property rights the pivotal voter prefers.
A straightforward corollary of (i) is that the political equilibrium leads to full public
protection of property rights,  = 0; if and only if  does not exceed some threshold.
Increased inequality might reduce (for a wide range of parameters) the expropriation gains
of the rich, and thus makes incomplete protection less attractive. This eect complicates
investigation of the impact of inequality on growth. While the direct eect of inequality on
9For a deeper discussion of a wealth bias of political system, see Benabou (1996).
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growth is negative, an increase in inequality forces the pivotal voter (who, all other things
being equal, becomes poorer than before) to call for more secure property rights and favor
more growth. The eect of a change in inequality on growth can be written down as
d
dﬀ
=
@
@ﬀ
+
@
@

=
 @
@ﬀ
;
where the rst term on the right-hand side represents the direct eect of inequality on
growth (holding policy, ; xed), and the second represents the indirect one. If property
rights are fully protected, then inequality aects growth exclusively through binding wealth
constraints. In the above analysis, it was assumed that protection of property rights is
provided by the state at zero cost, which is obviously not true. If agents bear costs of public
protection, they prefer even less such protection, and thus the above results become even
stronger.
Combining the solution to the maximization problem and intragenerational dynamics of
income within a family gives the law of motion for the family's income:
lnwit+1 = ln "it+1 + lnA+  ln p+ (1 + t) lnwi + lnw   (m(1 + t) + (1 + t)2ﬀ
2
t
2
);
where t is the level of property rights protection chosen in period t: (Recall that t is chosen
by agents born at the period t:) Assuming V ar [ln "it+1] = 2; one can get the autoregressive
process for inequality:
ﬀ2t+1 = 
2 + 2(1 + t)2ﬀ2t :
Now a marginal reduction in the level of property rights protection increases not only the
current inequality, but also inequality in all future periods.
Proposition 5 An increase in inequality leads (weakly) to a higher level of protection of
property rights by the state. If there is a strong wealth bias in the political system, then
there are multiple steady-states, with the 'bad' equilibrium characterized by high inequality
and low level of property rights protection.
In Russia, income inequality has increased dramatically during transition (Kolenikov and
Shorrocks, 2000). This might have increased the demand for public protection of property
rights as discussed above. However, this does not mean that the economy eventually nish
up with full protection. When a political system has a signicant wealth bias, it may be
locked in a bad long-run equilibrium, i.e. in an equilibrium with low level protection of public
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protection of property rights and low growth rate. As Hellman (1998) notes "the winners
[of reforms] might have an implicit veto power in the decisions over separate components
of reforms, especially those that aect their existing rent streams". A negative general
equilibrium feedback of inequality on the level of property rights protection worsens budget
constraints, and this eect allows to get multiple long-run steady states. The assumption of
imperfect capital markets is crucial for this result: if agents are free to lend to and borrow
from each other, their investment will always be socially optimal (given a level of property
rights protection).
The model above allows to get some implications about foreign direct investment to
transition economies, which is widely believed to be an important determinant in succesful
economic development. Brock (1997) found foreign direct investment in Russia (and other
FSU countries) to be much lower than in East European transition economies, not to say
about developed countries. Our analysis sheds some light on this phenomenon: First, in-
vestment in private protection is waste of resources for a foreign investor; second, in terms
of the model above, the overall investment should be very large to allow for redistribution
gains. The situation is even worse for a foreign investor as agencies providing protection in
the host country can discriminate. Last but not least, such an investment (e.g., a bribe to a
public ocial) may be considered illegal in the domestic country of the investor.
3.1 King John vs. Robin Hood
Glaeser et al (2002) call redistribution from poor to rich (our main case in this paper) the
King John redistribution, and redistribution from rich to poor (such as progressive taxation
or social security programs) the Robin Hood redistribution. Considering both types of
redistribution brings some non-trivial insights. In particular, having a rich pivotal voter
would help to oset eciency losses in the case of excessive taxation.
Formally, suppose that there is a progressive tax on capital, with some tax rate ﬁ : Similar
to Benabou (1996), it is assumed that redistribution is as follows. If the pre-tax capital is ki;
then the after-tax capital is eki = k1 ﬁi mﬁ ; where the multiplier m is dened by the balance
condition: Z 1
0
bkidi = Z 1
0
k1 ﬁi mﬁdi =
Z 1
0
kidi:
As before, incomplete protection of property rights also leads to some redistribution. The
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resulting i's capital stock is eki withZ 1
0
ekidi = Z 1
0
bk1 ﬁi hi gdi = Z 1
0
bkidi = Z 1
0
kidi:
For any ; the growth rate function exhibits usual properties: it is hill-shaped with respect
to ﬁ ; the tax rate (see Benabou, 1996 for full detail).
Proposition 6 For any tax rates ﬁ > ﬁ 0; there exists  such that for any pivotal voter with
 > ; the preferred levels of protection of property rights satisfy (ﬁ) > (ﬁ 0):
In words, if the tax rate is too high, then the pivotal voter (who need to be rich enough
to loose from taxation) tries to oset the losses by lowering level of public protection of
property rights. Polterovich (2001) obtains a similar result assuming that a xed portion of
the governments tax revenue is contested by economic agents.
This illustrates one particular diculty a government face: suppose that the tax rate is
below the growth-maximizing tax rate. Now if the pivotal voter determining the level of
property rights protection is rich enough, an increase of taxes would not lead to the desired
increase of the growth rate. The reason is that following an increase in taxes, the level of
property rights protection diminish. The impact through inequality would be fully oset,
and the only remaining (negative) eect would be of increased taxes on incentives to invest
in production. Vice-versa, if the tax rate is above the growth-maximizing rate, decreasing it
would bring additional benets of more secured property rights.
In most countries, the level of taxation (and, more generally, of redistribution toward
poor) is usually determined by the legislative power (a chamber of representatives, say),
while the level of property rights protection (the degree of subversion of the institution) is
determined endogenously by various political actors. If the level of taxation (i.e. redistribu-
tion of capital toward poor) and the level of property rights protection (i.e. redistribution
toward rich) are determined non-cooperatively by dierent pivotal voters, both of the parties
fail to internalize the resulting losses. Intuitively, this is similar to the case of two authorities
competing over one tax base by independently setting tax rates, a 'tragedy of commons'.
3.2 Economic vs. Institutional Reforms
The next goal is to show that a political base of economic reforms (dened broadly as mea-
sures to increase the tomorrow eectiveness at cost of the today consumption) narrows when
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protection of property rights is incomplete. Therefore, privatization, and any other economic
reforms aimed to improve eciency, are much less vulnerable for political opposition if it
follows institutional reforms such as increasing protection of property rights by the state
(Shleifer, 1997, Stiglitz, 2000). The intuition here is that with incomplete protection of
property rights, an agent is not sure that he can successfully transfer a part of his endow-
ment to the second period. Therefore, an agent (that losses due to re-distribution) is less
willing to sacrice today consumption for an increase in eciency tomorrow.
Formally, we illustrate this idea with a simple exercise, presenting an economic reform as
a trade-o between today consumption and enhanced production tomorrow. Suppose that
in the rst-period agents consider paying a xed share  of their rst-period consumption
for a next-period increase in production eciency (that is, an increase in ). The reform is
supported by agents, whose life-time utility increases.
Proposition 7 For large enough ; the measure of agents supporting a reform decreases with
the level of property rights protection: The larger is the inequality, the less voters support a
reform.
4 The Oligarchs
Aristotle used the word 'oligarchy' ('power of the few' in Greek) to describe a political
environment, where the rich rule for the own interests rather than those of the society. In
modern times, this word has applied e.g. to the ruling elite in Imperial Japan (Ramseyer
and Rosenbluth, 1995) and families possessing enormous economic power in Latin America
(Dosal, 1995) and East Asia (Claessens et al, 2000).
Claessens et al (2000) reports that the largest ten families in Indonesia and the Philip-
pines control more than half of the corporate assets (57.7% and 52.5%, respectively). The
concentration of control in the hands of large families is also high in Thailand (46.2%) and
Hong Kong (32.1%), Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore (25%).10 Claessens et al (2000) con-
clude their analysis to say that "The concentration of corporate control in the hands of
a few families creates powerful incentives and abilities to lobby government agencies and
public ocials for preferential treatment, whether through trade barriers, non-market-based
10For comparison, in Japan, the largest 15 families controled only 2.1% of GDP in 1996; in USA this
number was 2.9% of GDP in 1998.
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nancing, preferential public contracts, or other means. Concentration of control might also
have been a detriment to the evolution of the countries legal systems."
The rule of oligarchy is often associated with poor protection of property rights. Johnson
et al (2000) argue that the Asian nancial crisis had more severe eects in countries with
weaker investor protection (as measured by La Porta et al, 1997, 1998). One particular
mean of redistribtion of wealth toward politically valuable agents are capital controls (Rajan
and Zingales, 1998, 2002). Johnson and Mitton (2001) strongly support this view employing
data Malaysian rms before and after the imposition of capital controls. In particular, they
found that rms stock price performance in Malaysia is broadly supportive of the view that
capital controls create a screen for cronyism.
Transition experience provides another telling example. Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) use
Russian oligarchs as an illustration to their subversion-of-institutions theory. At the begin-
ning of the Russian transition, it was widely believed that institutional change, in particular
development of the institutions of property rights, is best driven by grass-roots demand.11 In
an ideal world, it is the rich who favor full protection of property rights, since it is they who
have most to lose in any re-distribution process. However, the reality appeared to be quite
dierent. Russian 'oligarchs', a small group of politically inuential people, that have taken
command of a major share of Russia's productive assets, is a sound counterexample. Having
accumulated enormous wealth and political power, they eectively blocked any attempts
of the government to improve property rights protection (Polishchuk and Savvateev, 1997).
Stiglitz (2002) says "Today, in Russia, we do not see demands for strong competition policy
forthcoming from the oligarchs, the new monopolists."
There is a number of academic papers and books on Russian oligarchs, including the most
recent ones by Freeland (2000) and Homan (2002), which combine a detailed description of
oligarchs' lives with political analysis. In this section, we collect some stylized facts about
Russian oligarchs, without colorful examples (for these, see references above).
In the early years, rents for redistribution have arisen from various arbitrage opportuni-
ties, provided, e.g., by foreign trade liberalization with incomplete price liberalization, or pri-
vatization in the absence of credit markets, which allowed managers to use state-subsidized
11Aslund (1995) argues that once "... the fundamental issues [of] the mutual independence of enterprises
from one another (as well as from the state) and their prot orientation [have been addressed], under such
conditions owners will forcefully try to ascertain their property rights".
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credits on short-term money markets (Hellman, 1998). Later, oligarchs have extensively
employed their political inuence during the privatization in 1993-1996,12 and since then
have been investing the capital obtained into extra-market redistribution (Polishchuk, 1995,
Homan, 2002). For a large stake of the Svyazinvest, a major telecommunication holding
in Russia, the parties employed newspapers, broadcasting programs (with no exception for
shows and news programs), and ocials of various ranks (with no exception for the Prime-
minister, Ministers of Finance, and the Minister for Domestic Aairs of Russia). During the
political war, one of the parties (UNEXIM ) announced the struggle for the establishment of
rule of law, including the determination and enforcement of property rights. Stiglitz (2002)
makes a general statement: "Demands for the rule of law have come from these oligarchs,
who obtained their wealth through behind-the-scene deals within the Kremlin, only as they
have seen their special inuence on Russia's rulers wane."
Before the Svyazinvest aair in 1997, the oligarchs rarely confronted each others as each
of them had its own branch of the economy (e.g., mass-media for Most-bank, natural gas
for Gazprom, international weapon trade for Rossiiskii Kredit, etc) and obtained rents from
it. To some extent, these holdings or nancial-industries groups has been formed within the
process of rent-seeking, and thus can be indexed by the rents they receive. Enterprises which
gain from natural or monopoly rents have been of particular interest for both Moscow nan-
cial groups and local strong men. Although the groups and their leaders had initially their
business in dierent branches of economy, eventually all of them started to acquire businessed
in unrelated elds, which have made their peaceful co-existence virtually impossible.
Among areas of common interest, mass-media have been of particular importance. During
political wars, newspapers and broadcasting programs appeared to be an extremely eective
mean of political inuence and rent-seeking. Accumulation of media-related assets by an
oligarch has lead to increasing political inuence, and thus redistributive power. Sometimes
investment into media has created additional social benets: e.g., the extensive usage of
broadcasting programs in rent-seeking has dramatically increased the quality of the overall
broadcasting performance.
Most visible conicts have arisen in the enterprises, where ambiguity in property rights
allowed dierent parties to control parts of enterprises' cash ows. Forms of the struggle
have been various, from an extensive murdering in Krasnoyarskii Aluminievyi Zavod to cum-
12Boyko, Shleifer and Vishny (1995) is the main reference on Russian privatization.
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bersome legal schemes in Nizhnevartovskneftegaz (although there were also some murders).
The latter (NNG) is a part of Tymenskaya Neftyanaya Kompania ( TNK). The Alpha-group
obtained a 40 percent of shares of TNK at an auction, and then struggled in arbitrage courts
to get a control other NNG for two years. During this time, the management of NNG
succeeded to sell all the property (including licenses) of NNG to newly created rms. Even-
tually, the Alpha-group took NNG under control, but has to ght for revision of decisions
made by the previous management. This example represents a huge variety of problems
connected with protection of rights of shareholders. Among an enterprises that are engaged
in disputes with its shareholders are oil and electricity companies, including Vostochnaya
Neftyanaya Kompaniya, Achinsky NPZ, AO Irkutskenergo, Sidanko, etc.13 Although protec-
tion to shareholders against arbitrary dilution of ownership was granted by a presidential
decree in August, 1995, many of western investors (especially those with small shares) have
been struggling for recognition of their rights. In many case, it has been necessary to obtain
a controlling interest in a company to get any access to information, which would have been
accessible to any shareholder in a western economy (Berglof and van Thadden, 1999).
The situation has been worsened as the state by itself have had no clearly dened policy
in the eld of property rights protection. Many of the documents regulating the privatization
of state enterprises and dening the rights of recent owners had been issued by the President
with no approval of the parliament. Although the Russian Constitution allows for such a
procedure, the established property rights have been still ambiguous, since major political
parties have claimed that the results of the privatization ought to be revised. The Control-
ling Committee (Schetnaya Palata), an independent body reporting to the parliament with
broadly dened controlling functions, has claimed that almost all the privatization auctions
(including that of Svyazinvest, Sibneft, Norilskii Nikel, Lebedinskii GOK, TNK, and many
others) were held with violation of the procedure, and thus the results should be revised.
In this situation, the main shareholders of newly privatized enterprises have not been inter-
ested in establishing clearly dened property rights, but rather in good relations with major
political players. (Li, 1996, stresses that ambiguous property rights may arise a response to
high uncertainties in the market place.)
At the beginning of Russian transition, there were almost no productive capital in pos-
session of economic agents (although some agents controlled remarkable parts of the state
13Freeland (2001) and Homan (2001) contain a handful of such examples.
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property). In this case, almost any prot-maximizing behavior included rent-seeking as an
integral part. Agents faced the situation, in which they had to expropriate a part of bud-
getary means or divert a state enterprise's cash ows to start business, and then to seek
for a budgetary nanced consumers. Clearly, for Russian rent-seeking, the liberalization of
economic activity prior to the privatization played an important role. It is conceivable that
if the spontaneous privatization of nancial ows would have been followed with a sponta-
neous privatization of capital assets, the situation with property rights protection at the later
stages of transition might be better. However, the former process (privatization of capital
assets) is necessarily much more observable than the latter (privatization of cash ows), and
thus faces more public resistance. It is an illustration to the general fact that open forms of
phenomena that has previously been hidden are associated with transition, although they
are denitely not new.
Rent-seeking environment in today's Russia was to a large extent inherited from the
Soviet economy. Under the former command system, property belonged to the state - in
other words, to everybody in general and no-one in particular. In its late years, the Soviet
economy represented a sort of a quasi-market economy. The operation of this economy
included rent-seeking as an integral and important part. Indeed, the extensive struggle of
expediters of state enterprises for scarce inputs, accompanied by wide-spread corruption,
was a kind of rent-seeking. This activity had often been growth- promoting as it partially
fullled the duties of the "invisible hand of market". At the same time, this way of economic
behavior was harmful for future development as it promoted formation of the behavioral
mores, in which private gain was founded mainly on distribution, and misallocation of the
human capital in the economy. Interestingly, the idea to treat the Soviet economy as a
rent-seeking society (Ekelund and Tollison, 1981), has not been yet recognized by a vast
majority of Russian politicians, political scientists, and economists. Even now, restoration
of the Soviet-type command system is often considered as measure to reduce or completely
eliminate rent-seeking.
5 Conclusion
This paper addresses the issue of inequality and institutions. The channel adopted goes
through directly unproductive, rent-seeking activities. Thus, the model provides insights
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in a much broader context than property rights protection. In the same spirit as Glaeser
and Shleifer (2001, 2002), the model accommodates a theory of institutional choice. Indeed,
assume that a social planner can freely choose the institutional parameter ; which has the
same formal meaning as in the basic model, and that it translates into a cost c(), where c()
is decreasing and convex. Referring to Glaeser and Shleifer (2001, 2002), we can interpret 
as the rigidity of the law: civil law would correspond to a low  and a corresponding high
eciency loss, while common law would correspond to higher levels of . The present model
will predict that with high levels of inequality, when redistribution is important, it is optimal
to choose higher levels of  at the cost of eciency. This modication emphasizes the trade-
o between eciency (which requires high levels of ) and subversion (which is mitigated
when  is low). With such an extension, the model provides a theory of institutional choice
consistent and complimentary to Glaeser and Shleifer (2001, 2002) and Glaeser et al (2002),
and documented by Djankov et al (2002).
For property rights protection, the theoretical analysis and existing empirical evidence
clarify the mechanism underlying the negative inuence of poor protection of property rights,
and political obstacles to full enforcement of property rights. Agents with no political power
to appropriate privately the fruits of their eorts must devote substantial resources to the
protection of their productive capital, and this reduces the attractiveness of production.
In other words, the contestability of property rights diminishes incentives to invest and
accumulate capital. In theory, it can be easily seen that improvements in the eld of property
rights protection (both in the level and the eectiveness), and a reduction in the level of
rent-seeking activity, which in turn should reduce inequality, are unavoidable preconditions
for economic growth. Such improvements may occur only if they are in the self-interest of
the majority of population or at least of the majority of those who determine the policy.
In this respect, further democratization should lead to more public protection of property
rights, and thus increase growth.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
The growth rate of the aggregate income is given by () = ln(y=w) = lnA+  ln s  (1 
)(1+)2 ﬀ22 : If the level of property rights protection increases (i.e.  becomes smaller), then s() =

1+(1+) ; the share of capital devoted to production, increases, and the term (1  )(1 + )2 ﬀ22
that represents losses due to redistribution and inecient resource allocation, decreases. Thus, the
growth rate () decreases with . If  = 0; there is no redistribution, and the growth rate is
maximized, (0) = lnA+  ln 1+   (1  )ﬀ22 :
Inequality enters the last term of the growth rate expression only. If ﬀ02 is larger, than the
losses increase, since budget constraints (in the absence of complete nancial markets) of agents
become more binding. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Interior solutions are guaranteed if   Aeﬀ2 min 11+ ; 2 ; 1 + 	 : The rst-order conditions
are as follows: 1wi ki hi =
A
Aki+wi=H
and hi = (wi   ki   hi): Then
ki =
1
2 + 

1  (1 + )
Aeﬀ2

wi = p(;)wi; hi =

2 + 
(1 +

Aeﬀ2
)wi = r(;)wi;
where the balance condition gives gH = eﬀ2 : Then the growth rate is given by
 = ln(y=w) = lnA+ ln
1
2 + 
+ ln

1  (1 + )
Aeﬀ2

:
Clearly, the growth rate  decreases with ; and  is maximized when  = 0:
Proof of Proposition 3.
First, we shall prove that the function
ui() = ln(1  (p+ r))wi +  lnAsw(1+)i w 
Ew1+i

is single-peaked for each i. For the maximization problem max0 ui(); the rst-order condition
is 1+1+(1+) + ﬀ
2(1 + ) = lnwi  m: Denote  () = 1+1+(1+) + ﬀ2(1 + ); the left-hand side.
Note that  (0) = 1 + ﬀ2 > 0: Taking the derivative, one gets  0() = ﬀ2   (1+)(1+(1+))2 : Clearly,
 00() > 0 when   0, and by assumption (ﬀ2 > 1+ )  0(0) = ﬀ2   1+ > 0. This implies
that  0() > 0 for all   0; whence  () is an increasing function of   0: Therefore, the
rst-order condition  () = lnwi  m has at most one root   0; and u0i() > 0; if 0   < 
and u0i() < 0; if  < : If there are no non-negative roots, i.e  (0)  lnwi  m; then u0i() < 0
for all   0; and therefore, i = 0:
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Now let w be such that lnw = lnw + 1 + ﬀ22 ; where w = Ewi = e
m+ﬀ
2
2 :
(i) The possibility to have i = j ; when wi 6= wj arises when wi  w as shown in (i). To
show that if wi > w; then i strictly increases with wi, suppose that wi < wj; and note that i
and j are roots of equations  () = lnwi m and  () = lnwj m; respectively. Then  (i ) <
 (j); since  is strictly increasing in ; and i < j follows.
(ii) If wi  w = e1+m+ﬀ2 ; then  (0) = 1 + ﬀ2  lnwi  m: Since  0() > 0 for all   0;
i = 0 as shown in the Proof of Lemma 1. If wi > w; then the equation  () = lnwi  m has a
positive root, i :
Proof of Proposition 4.
The level of property rights protection by the state is determined by the pivotal agent  with
w such that lnw = m + ﬀ: Thus, the equilibrium level of protection,  = ; satises
 () = lnw  m = ﬀ:
Since  is strictly increasing in ; the lower is ; the wealth bias, the lower is ; the equilibrium
level of protection. (Lower  corresponds to more protection.) Using Proposition 3, one gets that
if ﬀ > 1 + ﬀ2; then  > 0: On the other hand, if ﬀ  1 + ﬀ2; then  = 0: Therefore, an agent
with  = ﬀ + 1ﬀ is the wealthiest agent voting for full public protection of property rights. 
Proof of Proposition 5.
If  = 0; there is nothing to prove. Thus, it is assumed that  > 0: The rst-order condition
for the level-of-protection maximization problem (max0 ui()) is as follows: 1+1+(1+) = ﬀ  
ﬀ2(1 + ): Note that the left-hand side does not depend on ﬀ: If ﬀ2  12 ; then the right-hand side
shifts down and becomes steeper when ﬀ increases. Thus,  depends negatively on ﬀ:
Now suppose that ﬀ2 < 12 ; i.e. ﬀ <
1
4 : Consider some ﬀ < ﬀ
0; both less than 14 ; and let
 = (ﬀ) and 0 = (ﬀ0); respectively. First, we observe that if   ﬀ+ﬀ0   1; then 0 < :
Indeed, multiplying by (ﬀ02 ﬀ2); one can rewrite the former inequality as (ﬀ02 ﬀ2)  (ﬀ0 ﬀ) 
(ﬀ02 ﬀ2): Using 1+1+(1+) = ﬀ ﬀ2(1+); one obtains 1+1+(1+) +ﬀ02  ﬀ0 ﬀ02(1+):
Therefore, the line f() = ﬀ0   ﬀ02(1 + ) lies below the line f() = 1+1+(1+) + ﬀ02   ﬀ02
(note that both lines have the same slope). Since 1+1+(1+) decreases with ; 
0 < :
It remains to prove that  = (ﬀ)  ﬀ+ﬀ0  1: It is sucient to show that   2ﬀ  1: From
the rst-order condition, one gets ﬀ < 1 +ﬀ2(1 + ): It follows that 1 +  >  1ﬀ : Since ﬀ < 12 ;
 > 2ﬀ(  ﬀ): Hence, ﬀ > 2ﬀ +   ﬀ > 2ﬀ + 1ﬀ (the latter inequality follows from   ﬀ + 1ﬀ ):
Therefore, we proved that   2ﬀ   1 as claimed.
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There is a system of two equations that determines steady-states of the model:8<: ﬀ2 = 2 + 2(1 + )2ﬀ2;1+
1+(1+) = ﬀ   ﬀ2(1 + ):
Solving the rst equation for (1+) =
p
ﬀ2 2
ﬀ ; we substitute the result into the second equation to
get 1+
1+ ﬀ
p
ﬀ2 2 = ﬀ ﬀ
p
ﬀ2   2;an equation in one variable. Rewrite it as follows: 1+
1+ ﬀ
p
ﬀ2 2 +
ﬀ

p
ﬀ2   2 = ﬀ: It is straightforward to show that the left-hand side is an increasing concave
function. Then there exists some  such that for any   ; there are at least two steady-states.
Proof of Proposition 6.
In fact, Proposition 5 holds for all   0: The higher is the tax rate, the more equal is the
after-tax distribution of wealth. Then Proposition 5 could be applied to show that a higher tax
rate leads to a lower level of property rights protection.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Suppose that the reform requires each agent i to pay the share of  for the increase in produc-
tivity from  to 0: Then the agent i supports the reform as long as
0 ln p(; 0)   ln p(; ) + (1 + )(0   ) ln wi1+
Ew1+i
   ln(1  );
or equivalently
0 ln p(; 0)   ln p(; )
(0   )(1 + )2 + lnwi   (m+ (1 + )
ﬀ2
2
)  ln(1  )
(0   )(1 + )2 :
From this equation, one can determine the threshold ew = ew() such that any agent i with wi  ew
supports the reform. For large ; ew() is a strictly increasing in :
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